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Abstract 
In 2012 and 2013, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing 
and Industrial Base Policy (ODASD[MIBP]) implemented a methodology for measuring the 
criticality of key products and technologies (technology criticality), and their fragility within the 
industrial base (vendor fragility). During 2013, pilot assessment projects of selected DoD 
programs and sectors applied this methodology to measure nine constructs of technology 
criticality and six constructs of vendor fragility. While the 2013 pilots were completed in six 
months or less, we recognized that the time spent identifying the assessment issues and 
industrial base capability was still too long to be completely responsive to management 
information needs. In 2014, we explored guides for prioritizing the capabilities that are taken 
forward to the assessment teams and refined and categorized the filters used to reduce the 
amount of time devoted to this activity. Our goals were to reduce the overall amount of time 
to complete our assessments and to be proactive in identifying emerging issues, and agile in 
responding to existing ones. 
Background 
The Department of Defense (DoD) faces two kinds of risk in the industrial base—
voluntary and involuntary. Involuntary risk is incurred from external influences such as the 
Defense procurement budget, congressional mandates, and emerging national security 
threats. Each of these influences impacts DoD decisions on amount and type of activity that 
is distributed among the predominant factors of research and development, acquisition, and 
sustainment. 
Voluntary risk arises from the consequences of decisions within the Department’s 
sphere of influence. This includes decisions about when and how the Department will rely 
on market forces to create, shape, and sustain industrial and technological capabilities, as 
well as how it will intervene when absolutely necessary to create or sustain essential 
industrial capabilities. 
During the Korean War, DoD investment outlays comprised over 5% of total gross 
domestic product (GDP), sustaining a strong symbiotic relationship with U.S. industry of 
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earlier eras. The influence of defense investment outlays has dropped since the late 1980s 
to less than 2% of GDP, with a concentration of certain industries, globalization of markets, 
and increased export markets. The simple fact of having a private sector industrial base, 
frequently international, that is largely outside of the DoD’s control reduces the Department’s 
options for risk mitigation. However, that limitation is only a minor deterrent to action.  
Before we can implement any mitigation actions, we must first identify the action as a 
solution to a known industrial base deficiency. Before an industrial base deficiency can be 
known, we must be able to compare defense requirements to industrial base capabilities. 
Before we can compare industrial base capabilities to requirements, we must have visibility 
into capabilities of individual product and service providers and their supplier networks.  
In 2008, the Government Accountability Office reported that the DoD’s efforts to 
monitor its supplier base lacked a Department-wide framework and consistent approach. 
The report noted that (a) DoD monitoring efforts generally respond to individual program 
supplier-base concerns or are broader assessments of selected sectors; (b) the DoD uses 
an informal approach to identify supplier-base concerns, often relying on the military 
services, program offices, or prime contractors to identify and report these concerns, 
including gaps or potential gaps; and (c), since no requirement for which to report such gaps 
to higher-level offices exists, knowledge of defense supplier-base gaps across the DoD may 
be limited. 
In 2011, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing 
and Industrial Base Policy (ODASD[MIBP]) was tasked with developing a forward-leaning 
approach that could identify the cumulative effect on vital capabilities of procurement 
decisions across programs and services. We built on an existing 1996 framework to develop 
a methodology that could be used proactively, across services and industrial sectors, that is 
rigorous, repeatable, and transparent. The process became known as the Sector-by-Sector, 
Tier-by-Tier Fragility and Criticality (FaC) assessment process, or FaC for short.  
The results of the pilot effort conducted through summer 2013 and the methodology 
were presented at a research conference in May 2014 (Sleeper, Starns, & Warner, 2014). 
The 10 FaC pilot assessments identified important risks in the industrial base and provided 
actionable mitigation strategies to DoD leadership. The pilots assessed sectors and 
programs in diverse life-cycle phases, for example, development, production, and 
sustainment. Data collected from surveys, datasets, reports, and industry subject matter 
experts were used to assess the measures for capability/supplier pairs. Empirical and 
statistical analyses indicate that the methodology yields useful objective measures of risks in 
the industrial base.  
The pilots also provided lessons on how to improve the overall FaC process. One 
such process improvement is the use of filters that are adaptable that can be used to isolate 
areas where risks may be present in the industrial base to the delivery of support to the 
warfighter. To achieve this goal, we need to institute guides for prioritizing the capabilities 
that are taken forward for fuller resource-intensive assessment. The November 2013 
document, Assessing Defense Industrial Capabilities: A DoD Guide to DoDI 5000.60 
(hereafter referred to as the Guidebook; DoD, 2013), provides a framework to determine the 
need for government action to preserve industrial capabilities vital to national security. This 
paper presents an approach about how to apply criteria in the Guidebook and additional 
filters as “rules of thumb” to reduce the amount of time devoted to identifying and prioritizing 
areas of the industrial base for deeper dive assessments.  
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Overview of the FaC Process 
The DoD tested the FaC assessment process by completing 10 pilot FaC 
assessments in 2013 that included a mix of sectors and skill areas. From these pilots, the 
DoD refined the process and the resulting high-level overview, presented in Figure 1. The 
process is designed to be iterative and provide continuous expansion of the DoD’s insight 
into industrial base capabilities and constraints.  
The first activity is to select the assessment subject and scope. The assessment 
generally begins by choosing an industrial base sector or subsector within that sector. 
However, as additional insight is acquired, future iterations may focus on more limited 
technology or commodity areas. Selection of a program or sector for a FaC assessment is 
based on leadership priorities, industrial base analysis, and the results of prior industrial 
base assessments. 
A functional- or component-based taxonomy of the sector is used to scope 
assessment. Sectors, subsectors, and programs intersect in a number of ways, and the 
taxonomy provides the boundary for what is in or out of scope for a particular assessment 
and highlights where future efforts might focus. The taxonomy is instrumental to identify the 
sub-tier markets that comprise the sector, and to decide when to go broader or deeper in a 
subsequent iteration.  
The second activity in the process is to search for data and filter out non-
industrial base issues to support industrial base assessment. In today’s resource-
constrained environment, the analyst cannot afford to conduct an open, unbounded search 
for information. Once the assessment scope is selected, industrial base analysts evaluate 
available data sources for potential inclusion in the FaC assessment. Specific program or 
sector and supplier information included in existing databases, tools, programs, and so forth 
is identified through the FaC criteria lens.  
 
 FaC Assessment Activities, Actions, and Outcomes 
A DoD platform can have thousands of components and integrated subcomponents, 
require specialized skills, and draw upon numerous vendors below the prime contractor. An 
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industrial sector has even more—so many that it would be impractical to evaluate all of the 
components, skills, technologies, and vendors in any single assessment. Accordingly, 
before conducting a FaC assessment, the analyst applies filters to arrive at the target set of 
capabilities and vendors. The filtering activity is essential to the FaC process: Filtering rids 
the assessment of non-industrial base issues, and it protects against data overload by 
focusing efforts on areas with a higher potential of concern to the DoD.  
While some filters were used in each pilot assessment, additional filters tailored to 
the sector or program under investigation were also employed. Since the focus of the 
assessment is to identify risks in the defense industrial base, a crucial task is to weed out 
risks that, while important, are not important to the industrial base. Specifically, program-
related supply chain issues do not necessarily impact the industrial base. Accordingly, one 
of the screens applied to each capability is whether it is relevant to many platforms and 
services. If the answer is no, there may be risk in the supply chain for the capability, but it is 
not necessarily a risk in the industrial base since mitigation efforts are appropriately handled 
by the prime vendor or program office affected by the issue.  
The result of the data collection and filtering activity is a winnowed down set of 
capability-supplier pairs that are moved forward for the formal FaC assessment. In the 
assessments, a capability required from the industrial base is defined as a technology, part, 
component, or product. A supplier is defined as the current provider(s) of that capability. A 
capability, then, might be as small as an individual part, as large as an integrated 
subcomponent, or a specialized activity. Each capability is then paired with its current 
suppliers, and each capability-supplier pair is assessed separately. Accordingly, the same 
capability may be associated with multiple suppliers, and a single supplier may be 
associated with multiple capabilities.  
The third activity is to conduct the FaC assessment. The heart of the assessment 
process is the set of criticality and fragility criteria that serves as indicators of potential 
industrial base-related risk. Criticality, from an industrial base perspective, consists of 
indicators to identify when a capability would be difficult to replace if it was lost or disrupted. 
Fragility indicators focus on the robustness of current suppliers of a capability and the 
availability of potential firms in the current marketplace. The fourth activity is to validate 
high-risk industrial issues and develop mitigation strategies.1  
Filters and Screens: Narrowing the Field 
The FaC assessment process includes filtering steps to try to focus quickly on areas 
most likely to contain issues of interest to the DoD. Analysts can then focus their efforts on 
assessing and validating a small number of capabilities in a sector to determine which ones 
require further analysis, continued observation, or immediate mitigation. The findings and 
recommendations on possible mitigation strategies are then presented to leadership.  
Filters are used in many settings. Here we use them to sift through mountains of 
information and capture the capabilities in the industrial base that are required by the DoD, 
but may be at risk for any number of reasons. The use of filters, or screens, is akin to 
                                            
 
 
1 While the core of the FaC process is the application of the formal set of criticality and fragility criteria 
in the third activity, the previous working paper, which is available from the authors, documented this 
part of the process. 
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medical triage where patients are sorted quickly based on observed criteria associated with 
severity, and then further triaged and prioritized within the initial group using finer-grained 
sets of criteria, and, depending on resources available for treatment, screened again to 
prioritize mitigation and intervention actions. In the medical triage example, the patients who 
are not critical enough to make the first (or second or third) stage may have injuries or 
illness that need to be treated, but these are deferred and prioritized for subsequent 
assessment and treatment.  
When filtering is applied to the industrial base, the range of capabilities that may be 
at risk, and which can cause severe impact to the DoD, exist in an environment of 
components, technologies, and activities. The application of standard screening criteria 
serves to highlight at-risk capabilities, as well as illuminate the nature of the risk based on 
the criteria and severity. That is, like the medical triage example, the screening criteria can 
help assign priority order to mitigation and action on the basis of where funds and other 
resources can best be used, are most needed, or are more likely to achieve success. 
Taxonomies: The First Step to Scoping the Assessment 
Industrial base assessments may be triggered by an emergency or emergent alert or 
a routine evaluation of the health of an area of the industrial base. Emergency or emergent 
topics assessments may be prompted by any number of questions posed by leadership or 
industry, change in circumstances by a source of supply, or programmatic changes, for 
example. Typically these assessments are conducted within constrained timeframes and 
must provide defensible recommendations for action. At first glance, it may appear that the 
scope of the assessment is defined by the emergent topic. However, like the medical triage 
case, the industrial analyst has to wade through the number of at-risk and potentially at-risk 
areas quickly and efficiently to focus assessment resources on the likely areas. Further, the 
use of structured criteria help to transmit to leadership and other stakeholders how and why 
risk areas were included or eliminated for consideration. 
Having taxonomy for each industrial assessment is essential as it provides a scoping 
mechanism. At any point in an assessment, the analyst should know how much of a sector 
is being evaluated. Because the FaC is designed to be an iterative process, the taxonomy is 
instrumental in deciding whether you need to go broader or deeper in a subsequent 
iteration. As previously noted, the taxonomy establishes the boundary of a system so that 
the assessment team will know how much of the system that they have evaluated. Every 
assessment is limited by time, resources, and available information.  
In general, although by no means universal, the first assessment of any system or 
sector will focus on the assembly or functional levels of the system. During any FaC 
assessment, the team may discuss items where, by common agreement, not enough 
information is available to make a judgment. When that occurs, the assessment lead may 
elect to conduct a second assessment to probe deeper into lower levels of the taxonomy 
(see Figures 2a and 2b). 
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 (a): Application of Taxonomy to Bound Assessment Activities 
In some instances, there may be considerable knowledge about a system’s 
components. So the FAC lead would evaluate previous reports and studies and target 
portions of the taxonomy for a FaC assessment. 
 
Figure 2 (b): Application of Taxonomy to Bound Assessment Activities 
Example: A High-Level Filter for Isolating DoD Industrial Base Areas of Concern 
While the industrial base is composed of vendors, the risk to the DoD is disruption of 
supply of a capability, not disruption of a particular vendor. That is, it is the supply of the 
products, services, and skills that is assessed independent of who is the current supplier. 
Accordingly, the areas of potential risk focus on characteristics that make a particular 
capability difficult to replace if it is disrupted, not on characteristics about a firm.  
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The Guidebook provides the framework for the screens used to triage areas of 
potential risk in the industrial base. We employ the framework to sort through the capabilities 
in rapid fashion to identify those that demonstrate important risk characteristics. It is 
important to note that, like medical triage, the screens prioritize areas for further review—an 
area that does not meet the criteria does not mean that there is no issue, but rather that they 
lack the high-level indications associated with increased risk. As with any rack-and-stack 
process, maintaining a record of each screen is essential to the process.  
The screens are not intended for routine vendor management problems. As 
outlined in the Guidebook, vendor management problems are mitigated when a direct 
substitute product or service is available by another supplier that is willing and able to 
provide it within a reasonable time and price. Once these are eliminated, a high-level screen 
can be applied as a “thumbs-up/thumbs-down” check against the selected taxonomy to 
begin to identify areas of possible concern. For example, characteristics of a high-level filter 
relevant for the DoD generally include the following: 
 Operational impact of capability (pervasiveness across the DoD or platforms) 
 Low commercial market demand (few or limited applications) 
 Change in DoD demand expected over the FYDP (up or down) 
 Rapid rate of technical change expected (rapid advancement or 
obsolescence) 
 Limited sources of supply (domestic, foreign) 
 Anticipated future generation system requirements (next-gen) 
We apply the first screen to an Aircraft Sector Taxonomy presented in Figure 3 for 
two functional areas: Propulsion-Engine and Subsystems-Ejection System.  
 
 Notional Aircraft Taxonomy  
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 High-Level Screen for Aircraft Ejection System and Engine 
 
The preponderance of “yes” indicators for Ejection System suggests a closer look. 
Just like a medical triage, it is the location and severity of “symptoms” that direct our 
attention, rather than a hard-and-fast rule on the number of positive tick-marks. In the 
example for ejection systems, the combination of answers illuminate the potential reasons 
for concern including a marked demand decline of a defense specific system, a system 
resident on a broad number of platforms, and one procured from a limited set of suppliers. 
Note, however, that while the triage suggests further investigation, it does not indicate any 
specific area of risk. Further filters, described in the Guidebook, are applied to identify 
whether an assessment is warranted.  
In contrast, a review of aircraft engines suggests declining DoD demand, but a 
robust commercial market. The high-level filter would indicate this segment receives a lower 
priority than, for example, ejection systems, all else being equal. However, all else is not 
equal if the review is aimed at tactical aircraft, which have limited commercial analogs and 
continuous next-generation technology improvements. In this case, the analyst would apply 
another set of filters to identify whether an assessment is warranted. 
Refining the Scope 
Based on the rapid assessment above, we might rank potential areas of concern in 
order from ejection system, engines for tactical aircraft, and other commercially-similar 
aircraft engines, and apply resources for deeper dives accordingly. The next level of triage 
would examine a more detailed taxonomy for ejection systems against an increasingly 
focused set of filters from the Guidebook.  
Digging down further into the example of the ejection system, a new taxonomy 
emerges. The top level of the taxonomy appears very much like that for aircraft: structure, 
electronics, propulsion, and C4I, for example. An assessment of the system includes not 
only the integrator of the subsystems, but also sub-tier suppliers of components and skills. 
Filters are applied at every level to begin to identify where potential issues might reside, 
namely, identifying those capabilities that could be difficult to reconstitute if they were lost.  
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Example: A High-Level Filter Based on DoD Trends 
Another high-level screen is based on DoD funding to investigate involuntary risk 
incurred from changes in the Defense procurement budget. We use two views to begin to 
capture areas of potential concern. The first is a traditional sand chart to observe trends in 
the amount of funding for a sector for procurement and research and development. Sharp 
changes or steady incline, up or down, reveal areas for examination. The other is a view of 
existing and planned programs over time, independent of quantity, to look for gaps that 
could have an impact on capabilities in a particular sector.  
In the notional graphics presented in Figure 4, existing programs in a sector are 
displayed in two ways. The top graphic shows funding allocations by program over time. 
This example shows a steep buildup for some programs, followed by a sharp decline in all 
programs. Budget requests in the out years suggest funding increases, but these are not yet 
appropriated. The bottom graphic shows current and planned programs arrayed by their 
phase of procurement, sustainment, and development. We note (in this hypothetical 
example) that there are no currently funded programs in development, little new production, 
and some sustainment activity. One conclusion from the graphic is that engineering and 
design skills may not be exercised sufficiently; that is, the absence of new program starts or 
funded future programs may lead industry to divest itself of skills used in the design of next 
generation systems. In itself, this is insufficient for mitigation action. However, the 
observation creates a flag for a possible deeper dive into a skills assessment. Similarly, if 
there were no plans for next-gen technology based on an existing product of service, the 
absence of new programs would not raise a flag for development activities. Yet, in this case, 
the lack of production programs could signal an upcoming issue of obsolescence, which 
would need to be evaluated further.  
 
 DoD Funding and Program View for a Notional Sector  
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Taken together, the high-level screens presented in this section can quickly lead the 
analyst to areas of highest concern and provide justification for keeping or setting aside 
some parts of the taxonomy.  
Closing Comments 
The Guidebook provides the framework and guidelines for evaluating the need for 
government action to preserve industrial capabilities vital to national security. In the current 
fiscal environment, reduced DoD procurement affects prime vendor decisions on how to 
absorb cuts, and their decisions flow down to the sub-tier suppliers. The fundamental 
questions from an industrial base perspective in deciding what and where to make cuts are 
as follows: Will a capability that is needed to support the warfighter be available during a 
downturn and at the next upturn? Will the industrial base support the next generation of 
innovation? 
As MIBP executed the 2014 assessments, additional questions surfaced, including, 
for example, What is the impact of sequestration on the industrial base? Can the DoD 
design and produce the next generation system? Can we increase production rates if 
needed? The filters have proven to be adaptable. So, instead of a single, monolithic, filtering 
sequence, we soon realized that different questions required different filters to permit a 
manageable assessment. And for every question, there is a corresponding data set that is 
necessary to answer that question. 
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